Notes

Mistretta v. United States: Mistreating
the Separation of Powers Doctrine?
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Mistretta v. United States, the United States Supreme Court
upheld the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 against contentions
that the Act was a constitutional violation of the separation of
powers doctrine. This Note analyzes the Court's reasoning with
respect to the separationof powers doctrine. The analysis reveals
that, in Mistretta and other recent cases, the Court has departed
from its traditional mode of analysis in favor of a new model.
This trend is found to be misguided in that it incorrectly interprets the Framers' intent. This misinterpretationleads to the use
of incorrectfactors in analyzing separation of powers issues and,
therefore, incorrect decisions. The ultimate result is that the separation of powers doctrine is eviscerated and in turn the "structure"
of government, which ensures individual rights and personalfreedom, is threatened. In conclusion, a return to the traditional
method of dealing with separation of powers issues is advocated
because it is more reflective of the Framers'intent and more likely
to preserve the structure of our government and, thus, liberty.
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (Act)' established the United
States Sentencing Commission (Commission) as "an independent
commission in the judicial branch of the United States." 2 The Act,
passed after a decade long effort 3 and, in response to widespread dis1.
U.S.C.
2.
3.

Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 211, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified as amended at 28
§§ 991-998 (Supp. 1989)).
28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (Supp. 1989).
Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 651 (1989); Gubiensio-Ortiz v.

satisfaction with the intermediate-sentencing system,4 was aimed at
eliminating two "unjustifi[ed]" and "shameful" consequences of the
previous sentencing system. 5 The first was the great disparity in
sentences imposed by federal judges upon similarly situated offenders.6 The second was the uncertainty over the amount of time an
offender would spend in prison created by conflicting policies regarding parole, "good behavior in prison," and sentencing.7
The Act attempted to combat these problems by charging the
Commission with promulgating legally binding8 guidelines which
would eliminate sentencing disparities among similarly situated defendants.' Additionally, the Act prospectively abolished parole ° and
substantially curtailed "time off" for good behavior while in prison."1
The Commission was given considerable guidance by Congress on
the ultimate shape the guidelines should take. 2
The Act authorized the President to appoint the seven members of
the Commission, contingent upon confirmation by the Senate.1 3
Three commissioners were to be federal judges, who could serve

without resigning from the bench.' 4 After the initial six year appointment, commissioners could be reappointed by the President to
serve an additional six-year term.' 5 Commissioners could be removed
Kanahele, 857 F.2d 1245, 1246 (9th Cir. 1988).
4. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 651.
5. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 38, 65 (1983)).
6. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1983).
7. Id. at 48.
8. 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (Supp. 1989) (guidelines go into effect unless Congress,
within 180 days, decides to block or modify terms); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b), (c)(2) (Supp.
1989) (judges may deviate from guidelines, only if there are mitigating or aggravating
factors that the Commission did not adequately consider in formulating guidelines, and if
judges state their reasons on the record); 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(2)-(4) (1985) (parties
may appeal any sentencing decision inconsistent with guidelines); 28 U.S.C. §§ 994(o)(r), 995(a) (Supp. 1989) (Commission may supplement or amend guidelines).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (Supp. 1989).
10. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 235(b), 98 Stat.
1987, 2032-33 (1984).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) (Supp. 1989).
12. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1), (b)-(e) (Supp. 1989) (specifying form
and characteristics of offenders to consider in formulating guidelines); 28 U.S.C. §
991(b)(1)(A) (Supp. 1989) and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (1985) (directing Commission
to construct guidelines so as to promote goals of deterrence, public protection, rehabilitation and just punishment); 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (Supp. 1989) (Commission to develop guidelines that provide certainty and fairness in sentencing, and avoid sentence
disparities among similarly situated offenders while maintaining individual flexibility in
certain situations).
13. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (Supp. 1989).
14. Id. §§ 991(a), 992(c). Appointed by President Reagan to the three positions
reserved for federal judges were then district court and later Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals Judge William W. Wilkins, Chairman of the Commission, First Circuit Court of
Appeals Judge Stephen Breyer, and District of Columbia Court of Appeals Senior Judge
George MacKinnon.
15. Id. § 992(a)-(b).
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by the President "for
neglect of duty or malfeasance in office or for
16

other good cause."

The Commission adopted a set of guidelines which it submitted to

Congress. 1" Congress did not attempt to block or modify the guidelines within the six-month time period provided by the Act. Without

congressional modification the guidelines became effective for crimes
committed after November 1, 1987.18 By the time Mistretta v.
United Statesx9 reached the United States Supreme Court, 143 district courts,20 and one court of appeals 2 had struck down the Act as
unconstitutional. At the same time, 108 district courts 22 and one
court of appeals23 had upheld the Act's constitutionality. The courts
which invalidated the Act generally did so on the grounds that the
Act violated separation of powers. On January 18, 1989, by a vote of
eight to one, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
Act's sentencing guidelines in Mistretta v. United States.2 4

This Note examines the Court's decision in Mistretta and the previous case law upon which it relied. This Note concludes that in recent decisions, the Court has strayed far from the intent of the,
16. Id. § 991(a).
17. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §
235(a)(1)(B)(ii)(I), 98 Stat. 1987, 2032.
18. Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele, 857 F.2d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 1988).
19. 109 S.Ct. 647 (1989). This case was argued before the Supreme Court on
October 6, 1988. See 57 U.S.L.W. 1060 (Oct. 18, 1988).
20. Denniston, New Attorney General Lets His Inexperience Show, Ama. LAW. J.,
Jan./Feb. 1989, at 182; e.g., United States v. Eastland, 694 F. Supp. 512 (N.D. Ill.
1988); United States v. Mendez, 691 F. Supp. 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); United States v.
Kane, 691 F. Supp. 341 (N.D. Ga. 1988); United States v. Williams, 691 F. Supp. 36
(M.D. Tenn. 1988); United States v. Brown, 690 F. Supp. 1423 (E.D. Pa. 1988); United
States v. Alafriz, 690 F. Supp. 1303 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); United States v. Richardson, 690
F. Supp. 1030 (N.D. Ga. 1988); United States v. Serpa, 688 F. Supp. 1398 (D. Neb.
1988); United States v. Molina, 688 F. Supp. 819 (D. Conn. 1988); United States v.
Terrill, 688 F. Supp. 542 (W.D. Mo. 1988); United States v. Rosario, 687 F. Supp. 426
(N.D. Ill. 1988); United States v. Lopez-Barron, 685 F. Supp. 725 (S.D. Cal. 1988);
United States v. Arnold, 678 F. Supp. 1463 (S.D. Cal. 1988).
21. Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele, 857 F.2d 1245 (9th Cir. 1988).
22. Denniston, supra note 20, at 182; e.g., United States v. Weidner, 692 F. Supp.
968 (N.D. Ind. 1988); United States v. Schwartz, 692 F. Supp. 331 (D. Del. 1988);
United States v. Seluk, 691 F. Supp. 525 (D. Mass. 1988); United States v. Whitfield,
689 F. Supp. 954 (D. Minn. 1988); United States v. Landers, 690 F. Supp. 615 (W.D.
Tenn. 1988); United States v. Kerr, 686 F. Supp. 1174 (W.D. Pa. 1988); United States
v. Johnson, 682 F. Supp. 1033 (W.D. Mo. 1988) (en banc), aff'd, 873 F.2d 1446 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 2083 (1989); United States v. Ruiz-Villanueva, 680 F.
Supp. 1411 (S.D. Cal. 1988); United States v. Chambless, 680 F. Supp. 793 (E.D. La.
1988).
23. United States v. Frank, 864 F.2d 992 (3d Cir. 1988).
24. 109 S.Ct. 647 (1989).

Framers of the Constitution regarding the separation of powers principle. These decisions represent a departure from a fundamental
"structure" of our form of government and cornerstone of our basic
liberties and rights-the separation of powers doctrine. This Note
advocates a return, by the Court, to this architectonic principle of
our federal government.
II. THE MISTRETTA CASE
John M. Mistretta was indicted in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Missouri on three counts involving
the sale of cocaine.2 5 Mistretta moved to have the sentencing guidelines declared unconstitutional because the Act's creation of the
Commission was a violation of both the separation of powers and the
nondelegation doctrines."8 The district court rejected the nondelegation argument on the ground that the Commission, more properly
characterized as belonging to the executive branch,2 7 could be delegated such duties.2 8 The court also rejected the separation of powers
argument.2 9
Mistretta subsequently pled guilty and was sentenced under the
guidelines.3 0 Mistretta appealed to the Eighth Circuit. 31 However,
while the appeal was pending, both Mistretta and the United States
petitioned the Supreme Court for. certiorari under Supreme Court
Rule 18.32 By an eight to one vote, the Supreme Court sustained the
constitutionality of the Commission and its guidelines.3 3
Specifically, the Court held that the formation of the Commission
and its ability to promulgate guidelines was not an impermissible
delegation of power from Congress to the judicial branch. 4 In addi25. Id. at 653.
26. See id. Mistretta's motion was identical to claims made by other defendants in
the Western District of Missouri, and thus, the cases were consolidated before a panel of
sentencing judges. Id. at n.5.
27. United States v. Johnson, 682 F. Supp. 1033, 1035 (W.D. Mo. 1988) (en
banc), affld, 873 F.2d 1446 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2083 (1989).
28. Id. at 1034 (citing United States v. Spain, 825 F.2d 1426 (10th Cir. 1987)
(upholding constitutionality of delegation to executive branch of power to classify controlled substances, which determines judicial sentencing power)).
29. Id. at 1035.
30. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 653-54. Mistretta pled guilty to the first count of the
indictment (21 U.S.C. sections 846 and 841(b)(1)(B)--conspiracy and agreement to distribute cocaine). The Government's motion to dismiss the two remaining counts was
granted. Id.
31. See id. at 654.
32. Id. This procedure allows the Supreme Court to review a case before judgment
if the issue is of "imperative public importance" or if there is "disarray among the Federal District Courts." Id. (quoting Sup. Ct. R. 18).
33. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice Scalia was the
lone dissenter. See id. at 675 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
34. Id.
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tion, the Court found that placing the Commission in the judicial
branch was not an unconstitutional accumulation of power within
35
that branch, in violation of the separation of powers doctrine.
Moreover, the Court held that service of Article III judges on the
Commission did not undermine the integrity and independence of
the judicial branch."
A.

Delegation of Powers

Mistretta argued that Congress' authorization of the Commission
to promulgate guidelines embodying substantive policy decisions violated the nondelegation doctrine.3 7 This, Mistretta contended,
granted the Commission "excessive legislative discretion." '38
The Court noted that in its entire history it had struck down only
two statutes on delegation grounds.3 The Court's test for constitutional delegations required a consideration of whether Congress
manifested some type of "'intelligible principle' ,0 or "minimal
42
standards" '41 to which the Commission was required to conform.
The Court articulated two reasons why there were ample principles
and standards expressed by Congress.4 3 First, the Court found the
delegation constitutional. 4 Second, there was no case law suggesting
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. The nondelegation doctrine has been described as:
rooted in the principle of separation of powers that underlies our tripartite system of government. The Constitution provides that "[a]ll legislative Powers .. .shall be vested in a Congress of the United States," U.S. Const., Art.
I [section] 1, and we long have insisted that "the integrity and maintenance of
the system of government ordained by the Constitution," mandate that Congress generally cannot delegate its legislative power to another Branch.
Id. at 654 (citations omitted); see also United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 276 (1967)
(Brennan, J., concurring in result) ("Formulation of policy is a legislature's primary responsibility, entrusted to it by the electorate ... .
38. Mistretta, 109 S.Ct. at 654.
39. See Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (delegation
of legislative power to President to provide "codes of fair competition" for trades and
industries under section 3 of National Industry Recovery Act); Panama Refining Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (delegation of legislative power to President to interdict
transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum and petroleum products
under section 9 of National Industry Recovery Act).
40. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 654 (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United
States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)).
41. See id. at 658.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 655-57; see also supra note 12 and accompanying text.
44. Mistretta, 109 S.Ct. at 658.

that delegation of policy judgments was impermissible.4"
The Court concluded its discussion on a pragmatic note, observing
that the delegation to the Commission was "the sort of intricate, labor-intensive ' 6 task

appropriate. '4

for

which

delegation

.

.

. is

especially

B. Separation of Powers
The Court recognized that the Framers' intent was key to resolving the separation of powers issue.47 The Court's core concern was
over the "'encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the
expense of the other.' "48 If the shifting of power "either accrete[s]
to a single branch powers more appropriately diffused among separate branches or

. .

. undermine[s] the authority and independence

of one or another coordinate branch," the shifting is invalid. 49 In the
specific context of the Act, the Court decided that it would not be
"unconstitutional unless Congress ha[d] vested in the Commission
powers that [were] more appropriately performed by the other
Branches or that undermine[d] the integrity of the Judiciary. ' ' 0,
1. Accumulation of Power in the Judicial Branch
Mistretta argued that by locating the Commission within the judicial branch and partly staffing it with judges, Congress required the
judiciary to perform not only its judicial functions, but legislative
functions as well-that is, the making of sentencing policy. According to this argument, the accumulation of legislative and judicial
power within one branch aggrandizes the power of the judiciary, violating separation of powers. Mistretta further argued that case law
suggested that such rulemaking policy could be exercised by Congress, or delegated to the Executive branch, but could not be delegated to or exercised by the judiciary.5"
The Court rejected Mistretta's "aggrandizement" argument because the Commission was an independent agency separate from the
courts. This separation demonstrated that there was not an accumulation of power within the judiciary. 52 Additionally, because the
guidelines promoted less sentencing discretion among judges, judicial
power was diminished rather than "aggrandized. '53 Therefore, the
45. Id.; cf. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 276 (1967).
46. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 658.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 659 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976)).
49. Id. at 659-60.
50. Id. at 661.
51. Id. at 660.
52. Id. at 665-66.
53. Id. at 666.
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54
delegation" did not violate separation of power principles.
The Court acknowledged that the Commission was "a peculiar institution within the framework of our Government," 55 because
rulemaking was traditionally delegated to the executive branch.
However, the Court stated that separation of powers was not violated by "anomaly or innovation alone."5 6
Although article III of the Constitution limits the federal judicial
power to "'[c]ases' and '[c]ontroversies,' ,,51 and the general rule is
that "'executive or administrative duties of a nonjudicial nature may
not be imposed oni judges holding office under Article III of the Constitution,' "58 some judicial rulemaking exceptions are recognized.5 9
From these exceptions the Court synthesized the rule that if the "extrajudicial activities are consonant with the integrity of the Branch
and are not more appropriate for another Branch[,] . . . [there is]
no separation of powers impediment." 60 Since the judiciary, prior to
the Act, had always decided the same type of questions now assigned
to the Commission, 6 the Court reasoned that sentencing judgment
has been and remains appropriately exercised by the judiciary.6 2
Thus, the Court decided that the delegation was not a threat to judicial integrity, nor was the delegation inappropriate.
The Court stressed the appropriateness of Congress' delegation to
a Commission in the judiciary because "of the judiciary's special
knowledge and expertise." 6 Additionally, because the Commission
was in the judicial branch and the guidelines involved "do[ing] what
[judges] have done for geherations[,] . . . it follows that as a matter
of 'practical consequences'" the Commission should be located

54. Id. at 666-67.
55. Id. at 661.
56. Id.
57. Id. (quoting Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356 (1911)).
58. Id. (citing, Morrison v. Olsen, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2612 (1988); Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 123 (1976); United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40 (1852);
Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792)).
59. Id. at 662-64. The Court cited and discussed the following cases for this proposition: Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74 (1970) (judicial authority to make all
orders necessary for effective and expeditious administration of court business); Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965) (Congress authorized judiciary to promulgate rules for
conduct of its own business, rules of procedure for bankruptcy and other civil and criminal courts, and to revise the Federal Rules of Evidence); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312
U.S. 1 (1941) (act authorizing judiciary to promulgate Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure).
60. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 664.
61. See id. at 666.
62. Id. at 667.
63. Id.

within the judiciary.64

2. Undermining the Integrity and Independence of the Judicial
-Branch
Mistretta argued that the Act, by requiring the President to appoint three federal judges to serve with non-judges on the Commission, conscripted the judges into political service. Such required service by the judges arguably resulted in undermining the essential
impartiality and integrity of the judiciary. 65
The Court first observed that there is no express language in the
Constitution prohibiting active federal judges from serving on an independent commission.66 Additionally, history showed that judges
have assumed extrajudicial duties from time to time,6 7 and that the
Framers participated in such practices.6 8 However, the Court conceded that such practices were "controversial," and subject to much
separation of powers debate.6 9
The Court's historical examination of extrajudicial service, coupled with supporting precedent,70 led it to conclude that judges, sitting in their individual capacities, were not precluded by the Constitution from participating in extrajudicial activities. As long as judges
do not wield both judicial and extrajudicial power at the same time,
the Court found that such service was not prohibited.71 "In other
words, the Constitution . . . does not forbid judges from wearing

two hats;
it merely forbids them from wearing both hats at the same
72
time."
The Court thought the "ultimate inquiry" was whether the extrajudicial activity undermined the integrity of the judiciary.7 3 Key to
this inquiry were two distinct contentions posed by Mistretta: (1)
The mandatory service of the judges, and the appointment and re64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.

67. See, e.g., id. at 668 n.22 (Chief Justice Jay serving simultaneously as Chief
Justice and Ambassador to England; Chief Justice Ellsworth serving simultaneously as
Chief Justice and Minister to France; Chief Justice Marshall serving briefly and simultaneously as Chief Justice and Secretary of State), 669 (five Justices serving on Election
Commission that resolved Presidential election of 1876; Justices serving on arbitration
commissions, commission investigating attack on Pearl harbor, and commission investigating assassination of President Kennedy; Justice serving as prosecutor at Nuremberg
trials) & nn.24-25 (compiling extrajudicial activities by other Justices and lower court
judges).
68. Id. at 668 n.22.
69. Id. at 669.
70. Id. at 670-71. The Court studied United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.)
40 (1852) and Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 409 (1792).
71. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 670.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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moval power of the President, which diminish the independence of
the branch; and (2) judicial participation in the political policymaking of the Commission, which "'[w]eakens confidence in the disinterestedness of the [judiciary],' ,,74 thereby threatening the branch's
impartiality.
The Court addressed the independence issue by stating that service on the Commission was not mandatory. The three judges on
the
75
Commission had all accepted their appointments voluntarily.
The threat to independence posed by the President's ability to appoint and remove Commissioners was viewed by the Court as de
minimis.7 6 The Court noted that the President always had "within
his appointment portfolio" positions attractive to judges, but that, in
and of itself, was insufficient to corrupt the integrity of the judiciary . 7 Similarly, the President's removal power would have a negligible affect because it (1) may only be exercised for good cause;78 (2)
cannot affect judicial tenure or compensation of judges;79 and (3)
cannot be used to coerce judges in the exercise of their judicial
duties.8 0
The impartiality issue was disposed of by the Court's characterization of the Commission's endeavors as being "close to the heart of
the judicial function" and therefore, politically "neutral." Because
the Commission's work was "not inherently partisan," the Commission did not threaten the judiciary's impartiality "in fact or in
appearance." 8'
Summarizing, the Court stated that Mistretta's contentions were
"'more smoke than fire,' and do not compel us to invalidate Congress' considered scheme for resolving the seemingly intractable dilemma of excessive disparity in criminal sentencing." 82

74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 671-73 (citations omitted).
Id. at 672.
Id. at 674.
Id.

78.

28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (Supp. 1989). "Such . . . limitation on . . . removal

power . .. [is] specifically crafted to prevent the President from exercising 'coercive influence' over independent agencies." Mistretta, 109 S.Ct. at 674-75 (citing Morrison v.
Olsen, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988); Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. 602, 630 (1935)).
79. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 674.
80. See id. at 675.
81. Id. at 673.
82. Id. at 661.

III.

INTRODUCTION TO SEPARATION OF POWERS

A.

The Framers83

The concept of separation of powers is recognized as essential for
83. This Note assumes that the Framers' intent, and thus, history is important in
resolving constitutional issues. Conversely, other commentators have "called the historical enterprise to determine original intentions a misconceived quest." Wilson, The Most
Sacred Text: The Supreme Court's Use of The FederalistPapers, 1985 B.Y.U. L. REv.
65, 69 (1985) (citing Brest, The Misconceived Quest for Original Understanding, 60
B.U.L. REV. 204 (1980)). Professor Brest feels that "one can better protect fundamental
values and the integrity of democratic processes by protecting them than by guessing
how other people meant to govern a different society a hundred or more years ago."
Brest, supra, at 238. However, insofar as the "Supreme Court has determined that history is relevant in constitutional adjudication," Wilson, supra, at 68, so does this Note.
Additionally, "Framers" are defined as the "55 men from 12 states .. . [that] had
been gathered [at the Philadelphia Convention.]" F. RODELL, 55 MEN: THE STORY OF
THE CONSTITUTION BASED ON THE DAY-BY-DAY NOTES OF JAMES MADISON 4 (1936);
see also B. SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 4 n.2 (1955) ("members of

the Convention that drew up the Constitution in 1787 are usually called [the Founding
Fathers.]"); J. LIEBERMAN, THE ENDURING CONSTITUTION: AN EXPLORATION OF THE
FIRST Two HUNDRED YEARS 10 (1987). "We idolize them today and speak of them as
'the Framers' or 'the Founding Fathers,' and surely we were fortunate that among them
were so many men of wisdom and common sense." F. RODELL, supra, at 4.
This Note relies heavily upon the Framers' intent, as elaborated by Madison in The
Federalist to resolve the question of separation of powers. It is acknowledged that other
relevant historical sources are also used to establish Framers' intent and the meaning of
the Constitution. See, e.g., 3 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CON-

STITUTIONAL

LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE

481-83, 511-15 (1986) (historical condi-

tions and circumstances, debates in Constitutional Convention, congressional interpretations prevailing at time of Founders, legislation enacted soon after adoption of provision).
These other sources are used as frequently as possible, and generally, they support the
conclusions of The Federalist.However, it is noted that historical conditions and circumstances (such as the debates in the Constitutional Convention) "should not control the
fair meaning and general scope of the Constitution." Id. at 482. Moreover, the discourses
on this particular issue of separation of powers in these sources are limited, and pale in
comparison to the essays by Madison in The Federalist.Madison "is widely hailed as the
'father' of [both] the Philadelphia Convention," Carey, James Madison on Federalism:
The Search for Abiding Principles, 3 BENCHMARK 27, 27 (1987), and "the Constitution," Peterson, Editor's Introduction, 3 BENCHMARK 1, 1 (1987). Furthermore, it is
generally recognized that "Madison launched the most extensive and theoretically coherent discussion of the doctrine of the separation of powers" in The Federalist. 1 P. KURLAND & R. LERNER, THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 313 (1987). The Federalist is seen
by some as "simply the more polished presentation .. .of the same arguments that had
been made at the Convention." Peterson, supra, at 1.
Moreover, congressional interpretations at the time of the Founders are irrelevant because there were yet to be congressional interpretations with which to refer. Finally,
research for this Note revealed no legislation enacted soon after the adoption of the Constitution dealing with this separation of powers issue.
The Federalistis one of the most voluminous and concise sources of information on
separation of powers by the Framers. See 1 P. KURLAND & R. LERNER, supra, at 313.
Similarly, what better author to consult than Madison, a "Framer or Founding Father";
indeed, one of the "paragons of an extraordinary generation,. . . a leader of the Constitutional Convention." Quint, The FederalistPapers and the Constitution of the United
States, 77 KY. L.J. 369, 371 (1989). "In fact, in discussing the evolution of constitutional
principles and doctrines, the modern Court has frequently consulted The Federalistas its
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the preservation of liberty. 4 "The accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and judicial in the same hands . . . may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny." 85 The Framers attempted to balance governmental powers equally and recognized that
the legislative branch was most likely to usurp the authority of the
others."6
Separation of powers was incorporated into our tripartite theory of
government: "All legislative Powers . . . shall be vested in a Congress of the United States";8 7 "The executive Power shall be vested
in a President of the United States"; 8
"The judicial
Power . . . shall be vested in one [S]upreme Court."89 Although
the concept of three distinct branches of government was of major
importance to the Framers, separation of powers did not mean that
the branches must be hermetically separate. e0 Some overlapping of
first source." Wilson, supra, at 83 (emphasis added).
On the other hand, The Federalist's authoritativeness is not completely free from attack. For example, at least one commentator stated that the Constitution was merely a
document resulting from the Founders' attempt to protect their own economic interests,
see C. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED

(1913), and that The Federalistwas merely "blatant propaganda" intended to
gain the acceptance of the proposed Constitution, Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1018 (1984); see also Roche, The FoundSTATES

ing Fathers: A Reform Caucus in Action, 55 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 799, 804 (1961). Not-

withstanding the fact that these views have been strongly criticized, Peterson, supra, at 1
("Roche's presentation .. .collapses with its own inherent contradictions."); Wilson,
supra, at 105-14 (summarizing numerous opponents to Beard's "economic" theory),
there remains the Supreme Court's increasing use of The Federalistin general. Id. at 6566 n.3. In particular, it is frequently used in separation of powers issues. Id. at 91. The
reason for this is not crystal clear, but one might reasonably surmise, as this Note does,
that the Court has concluded that The Federalistis the controlling source with respect to
separation of powers.
Regardless of whether one considers the essays in The Federalistas propagandistic or
pedagogical, the issue of whether the Court will continue to consult the essays is not in
question. In light of this, the inquiry should focus on what the Framers meant by these
writings, not whether The Federalist should be consulted.
84. Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 658 (1989). With regard to separation of powers, Madison stated, "No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value
or is stamped with the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty." THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 324 (J.Madison) (. Cooke ed. 1961).
85. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 84, at 324 (J.Madison).
86. "[I]t is not possible to give each department an equal power of self defence. In
republican government th legislative authority, necessarily predominates." THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 84, at 350 (J.Madison).
87. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
88. Id. art II, § 1.
89. Id. art. III, § 1.
90. "[Separation of powers] did not mean that these departments ought to have no
partial agency in, or no controul over the acts of each other. . . .[W]here the whole
power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power

power was tolerable. 91 Violations of the doctrine 2 arose when one
branch: (1) exercised the whole power of another branch;93 (2) directly exercised the complete power more properly belonging to another branch; 4 (3) possessed an overruling influence over the other
branches in the exercise of their respective powers;95 or (4) exceeded
the power assigned to it by the Constitution."'
B.

The Case Law

Recently, there has been a split of authority regarding what the
Framers intended by the separation of powers doctrine. 7 The traditional "formalist" view stresses the need to keep the three government branches as separate as possible, and requires that each branch
only exercise its own powers as set out in the Constitution. 8 The
"functional" approach does not consider the core inquiry of the formalist view (that is, what branch is exercising what power) as determinative. Rather, commingling of powers is acceptable as long as the
exerted power does not intrude into the core functions or domain of
the branches involved.
of another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution, are subverted."
THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 84, at 325-26 (J. Madison).
91. Id.
92. This Note does not address the modern phenomenon of the "administrative
state" and the issues it raises. This topic is better suited to a nondelegation doctrine
analysis, although it is conceded that the nondelegation doctrine and the separation of
powers doctrine are intertwined.
Even if analyzed from the separation of powers perspective, arguably, such delegation
of power by Congress to the executive branch is valid under either method of analysis
used by the Court for separation of powers issues. See infra notes 97-104 and accompanying text. The functional approach would easily accommodate such a shifting or commingling of power. Under the formal theory, the commingling is more difficult to reconcile. However, the commingling could be reconciled by asserting that Congress has not
delegated its whole power to the executive, or that rulemaking, as opposed to lawmaking,
is not an exercise of legislative power. Additionally, it could be asserted that rulemaking
power is an executive power and thus properly exercised by the President.
93. Trm FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 84, at 325-26 (J. Madison).
94. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, supra note 84, at 332 (J. Madison).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 332-33.
97. See Krent, Separatingthe Strands in Separation of Powers Controversies, 74
VA. L. REV. 1253, 1254-55 (1988).
98. See id. at 1254. This appears to have been the prevailing view on the Supreme
Court until recently. E.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (Congress may not
exercise executive power); I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (Congress may not
exercise its power through the executive branch); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Executive may not exercise legislative power); Myers v.
United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1925) (legislative participation in executive power "infringe[s] the constitutional principle of the separation of governmental powers"); see also,
Mistretta v. United States, 109 S.Ct. 647, 678 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (legislative
power anywhere but in the legislative branch is unconstitutional).
99. Krent, supra note 97, at 1254-55. Accord Morrison v. Olsen, 108 S.Ct. 2597
(1988) (power exerted is constitutional if not "incongruent" with functions normally exercised by endowed branch, and power does not "impede" upon ability of branches to
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The trend in Supreme Court decisions has recently embraced

"functionalism." 10 0 In the recent case of Morrison v. Olsen,' 0 ' the

Court adopted the functional theory to analyze "independent"
agency situations. Morrison did not apply the formalistic rule which
asked: Is the power exercised by the branch power assigned to the
branch by the Constitution? 1 2 Instead, the inquiry was, notwith-

standing the Constitution, whether the exercised power was incongruent with the branch exercising it,loa and whether the branch it
was being exercised against was impeded in its constitutional duties. 04 Hence, Morrison laid the groundwork for Mistretta.
C. Mistretta
Mistretta illustrates that the functional view of separation of powers as set forth in Morrison is here to stay. Morrison was thought by

some to be a "fluke" or to be "illogical."'10 5 However, the decision by
the Court in Mistretta appears to tip the balance of precedential
perform their constitutional duties).
100. E.g., Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787
(1987); see also Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 681 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
101. 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988). This case is known as the independent counsel case.
In 1978 Congress passed the Ethics in Government Act (EGA). The EGA allowed for
the appointment of an independent counsel with the "full power" of the Department of
Justice. The independent counsel was charged with investigating and prosecuting government officials for violations of federal laws, and reporting on these activities to Congress.
The independent counsel could be removed by the Attorney General, but only for "good
cause." See id. at 2602-04.
In addition, Article III judges were appointed to a "Special Division." Their responsibilities included appointment and termination of independent counsels, as well as defining
the jurisdiction of the independent counsels. Id. at 2602-05.
The Court held that even though the judiciary, through the Special Division, had the
power to appoint, terminate, and define the jurisdiction of the independent counsel (not
appointed by the Executive) who was exercising executive prosecutorial powers, and over
whom the executive branch had little ability to terminate (only for "good cause"), the
commingling of judicial and executive power by Congress was not unconstitutional. Id. at
2608-22.
Because the power vested in the judiciary was not incongruent with judicial branch
activities, and did not impede the executive branch in the performance of its constitutional duties, there was no violation of the separation of powers. Id. at 2611.
102. Under the formal approach, the branch exercising the power is characterized
(i.e., judicial, executive, legislative), and the power is characterized-if the branch and
the power do not match there is a violation of the separation of powers. See supra note
98 and accompanying text.
103. Morrison, 108 S.Ct. at 2611.
104. See id. at 2619.
105. Carter, In Upholding Sentencing Commission, Justices Put Separation of
Powers on the Ropes, MANHATTAN LAW., Jan. 31, 1989, at 13; Mistretta, 109 S.Ct. at
681 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

authority in favor of functionalism as the rule rather than the exception when analyzing separation of powers issues. Yet, functional
analysis is contrary to the principles of separation of powers. Indeed,
reliance on functionalism to remedy separation of powers problems
runs contrary to the Framers' intent. Mistretta helps to perpetuate a
mode of analysis that "will be disastrous."106 The following section
argues in favor of a return to the formalistic approach in deciding
separation of powers issues.
IV. FUNCTIONALISM IS MISGUIDED

What is wrong with functionalism? Proponents argue that they do
not espouse excessive shifting of power between the branches which
ultimately may lead to "aggrandizement" or "tyranny. ' 10 7 Rather,
functionalists argue that small amounts of extra-constitutional shifting or commingling is acceptable, and, in fact, endorsed by the
Framers. 08 Moreover, they note that the exigencies that motivated
the Framers to emphasize separation of powers' 0 are no longer critical in modern times. Today, the United States is a world power, recognized as a leader in democracy and individual rights. In addition,
the enormous and complex structure of contemporary federal government is beyond anything the Framers could have contemplated.
Because there is no longer the fresh memory of "tyranny," coupled
with the fact that the modern federal government is so large, some
compromise of the separation of powers doctrine is needed to accommodate efficiency and convenience.
In effect, the argument for functionalism is a contemporary view:
what is convenient or workable today is controlling, and the intent of
the Framers' is nothing more than a "generalized prescription
that . . . [powers] should not be commingled too much." 1 0 This
viewpoint, however, is flawed.
The Constitution is the "supreme law of the land.""' A convention of delegates representing twelve of the thirteen original states
framed the Constitution in 1787.112 The basic intention of the Framers resulted in the Constitution."13 In addition, eleven of the twelve
106. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 683 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
107. See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text; see also discussion infra notes
122-30, 196-229 and accompanying text as to why this interpretation of the Framers'
intent is misguided.
109. For example, the instability of a new nation, and the fresh memory of a nonrepresentative and nondemocratic government.
110. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 682 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
11. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 331 (1941); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803).
112. 16 CJ.S. ConstitutionalLaw § 4 (1984).
113. G. McDOWELL, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION SERIOUSLY 1 (1981); 16 C.J.S.
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states ratified the Constitution.114 In interpreting the Constitution, a
fundamental principle of construction is to give the effect intended

by the Framers and the people adopting it.115 Two of the Framers,
James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, wrote a series of essays

with John Jay collected in The Federalist."6 The construction given

to the Constitution by the authors of The Federalist is entitled to

great weight.117 As such, the Framers' intent (particularly that of
ConstitutionalLaw § 20 (1984) ("The intent of the framers of a constitution is to be
found in the instrument itself.") (citing State v. Kahlbaun, 64 Haw. 197, 638 P.2d 309
(1981).
114. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 4 (1984).
115. See Tom v. Sutton, 533 F.2d 1101, 1105 (9th Cir. 1976). "It is never to be
forgotten that, in the construction of the language of the Constitution ... as indeed in
all other instances where construction becomes necessary, we are to place ourselves as
nearly as possible in the condition of the men who framed the instrument." Ex parte
Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 12 (1887).
Madison consistently directed those looking for the correct interpretation of
the Constitution to look to the time of its "founding." In 1824, or 36 years
after the ratification of the Constitution, Madison wrote that on questions of
constitutional interpretation we should resort to "the sense in which the Constitution was accepted and ratified by the nation" for in that sense alone was it
the "legitimate Constitution."
In a letter to Andrew Stevenson in 1826, Madison warned that if the Constitution "be interpreted by criticisms which lose sight of the intention of the
parties to it .. .the purest motives can be no security against innovations materially changing the features of the government.
Thus, Madison supported the doctrine of original intention and did not believe in the doctrine of a "living" Constitution. He believed that the Constitution contained a specific meaning which did not change over time. That meaning was established and sanctified through the formal act of popular
ratification and could only be changed through amendment or a clear, continued, and equivalent expression of the national will.
Ong, James Madison on ConstitutionalInterpretation,3 BENCHMARK 17, 18 (1987).
Functionalists may argue that the Framers intended that the Constitution be a contemporary document, able to change with, and adapt to the issues of modern times. Indeed, the Framers did provide for such change. However, it is contended that the Framers did not intend for the Constitution to be contemporized by judicial fiat. Rather, the
amendment process, which is the exclusive means endorsed in the document, was the
preferred method of changing the Constitution-for any reason.
116. 3 R. ROTUNDA, supra note 83, at 515.
117. Id.; Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 612 (1895); Transportation Co. v. Whelling, 99 U.S. (9 Otto.) 273 (1878); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 433 (1819). In Cohens v. Virginia the Supreme Court stated:
The opinion of The Federalist has always being [sic] considered as of great
authority. It is a complete commentary on our constitution; and is appealed to
by all parties, in the question to which that instrument has given birth. Its
intrinsic merit entitles it to this high rank; and the part two of its authors
performed in framing the constitution, put it very much in their power to explain the views with which it was framed. These essays having been published,
while the constitution was before the nation for adoption or rejection, and hay-

James Madison and Alexander Hamilton) should be controlling in
any matters of constitutional interpretation. "[T]hose who have
framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently, . . .an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution
is void." '
As discussed earlier,1 9 the Framers accepted the doctrine of separation of powers as absolutely essential to liberty. 20 Therefore, one
would think that when faced with the issue, the Court would scrupulously consider what the Framers intended as a valid separation of
powers and, more importantly, what the Framers considered an unconstitutional shifting of powers. Moreover, because of its importance to the Framers, in situations where it is unclear whether the
shifting or commingling of power is violative of separation of powers
principles, courts should strike down the shifting or commingling of
power so as to ensure preservation of the doctrine.
The application of the functional theory of analysis in Mistretta is
flawed for four reasons. First, there is a failure to properly discern
the Framers' intent. 2 ' Second, because of this misinterpretation, ining been written in answer to objections founded entirely on the extent of its
powers, and on its diminution of state sovereignty, are entitled to the more
consideration, where they frankly avow that the power objected to is given, and
defend it.
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 418-19 (1821).
"The FederalistPapers, [James] Madison wrote to [Thomas] Jefferson in 1825, 'may
fairly enough be regarded as the most authentic exposition of the text of the Federal
Constitution, as understood by the Body which prepared and the authority which accepted it.'" Ong, supra note 115, at 20.
Modern commentators also find that The Federalistis particularly relevant and "has
its main impact on litigation concerning governmental structure," because it "is basically
concerned with governmental structure [such as separation of powers]." Quint, supra
note 83, at 389; see also Wilson, supra note 83, at 83 ("One sees continued respect for
The Federalist in the Court's steadily increasing number of citations to that document."), 91 ("The modern Court has also frequently referred to The Federalist in cases
raising the issue of separation of powers."), 65-66 n.3 (table showing the significant increase in citations to The Federalist by the Supreme Court in modern times), 66 n.6
("The Federalist has been admired by politicians and theorists since its initial
publication.").
118. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
119. See supra notes 84-96 and accompanying text.
120. The separation of powers is the "essential precaution in favor of liberty," THE
FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 84, at 323 (J. Madison), or "the mirrour of political
liberty." Id. at 325.
121. Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 682-83 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
[T]he framers themselves considered how much commingling was, in the generality of things, acceptable, and set forth their conclusions in the document. . . .When [Madison] said, as the Court correctly quotes, that separation of powers 'd[oes] not mean that these [three] departments ought to have
no partialagency in, or no controul over the acts of each other,' . . . his point
was that the commingling specifically provided for in the structure .. .did
not violate a proper understanding of separation of powers. He would be
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correct factors are used in the inquiry. Third, because the inquiry is
distorted, separation of powers issues are not given proper analysis,
resulting in destruction of the doctrine. Fourth, the evisceration of
the doctrine leads to a contraction of individual rights and freedoms.
A.

Misinterpretationof the Framers' Intent

In Mistretta, the Court quotes James Madison 122 and interprets
his writings to mean that the separation of powers doctrine is "flexible" and does not require a "hermetic division" between the
branches.12 3 This is the starting point of a major misinterpretation of
the Framers' intent. Justice Scalia, writing in dissent, finds the
Court's interpretation incorrect.1 24 The misunderstanding centers on
the interpretation of James Madison's statement that separation of
powers does "not mean that these departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no controul over the acts of each other.' l2 5 The
apparent meaning the Court gives this phrase is that "while the Constitution mandates . . . that . . . the . . . departments . . . remain
entirely free from . . . either of the others, . . . the Framers . . . rejected . . . the notion that the three Branches must be
entirely separate and distinct.' 2 6 In other words, the Constitution is
merely a "generalized prescription that the functions of the Branches
should not be commingled too much."'12 7 This interpretation uses the
aghast, I think, to hear those words used as justification for ignoring that carefully designed structure so long as, in the changing view of the Supreme Court

Id.

from time to time, 'too much commingling' does not occur.
122.

See id. at 658-59. The Court quotes Madison because he is generally ac-

knowledged as one of the pre-eminent Framers of the Constitution.
The convention was over; it had completed its work. In the achievement of its
task James Madison had been unquestionably the leading spirit. It might be
said that he was the masterbuilder of the constitution. This is not an overvaluation of his services derived from his own account of the proceedings in conven-

tion, for Madison laid no undue emphasis upon the part he himself played; in
fact, he understated it. Nor is it intended to belittle the invaluable services of
many other delegates. But when one studies the contemporary conditions, and
tries to discover how well the men of that time grasped the situation; and when
one goes farther and, in the light of our subsequent knowledge, seeks to learn

how wise were the remedies they proposed,-Madison stands pre-eminent.
M. FARRAND, FRAMING THE CONSTITUTION 196 (1962); see also Carey, supra note 83,
at 27; Peterson, supra note 83, at 1; Quint, supra note 83; at 371.
123. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 659.
124.

See id. at 682-83 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

125.
126.
127.

THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 84, at 325 (J. Madison).
Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 659.
See id. at 682 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

Constitution as a nondeterminative, general guide for the Court's
consideration.
The Framers did not intend the Constitution as merely a starting
point in analyzing separation of powers issues. Instead, they meant
for the Constitution to be a definitive compilation of the acceptable
commingling of powers.
To understand the true meaning of what James Madison meant by
this statement, it is necessary to consider a series of essays in The
Federalist, where Madison wrote about the separation of powers.
Specifically, essays forty-seven through fifty-one were authored by
Madison128 and, when considered in the aggregate, allow for the ascertainment of the meaning of separation of powers.
Essay forty-seven contained the phrase in question. In this piece,
Madison addressed objections raised by opponents of the proposed
constitution .

29

There was much criticism at the time that the

branches of the proposed government were not completely separate
and distinct-a violation of the "political maxim" of separation of
powers. 30
128. It should be noted that there is a minor dispute regarding the authorship of
essays forty-nine to fifty-one-both Madison and Hamilton have claimed to be the author at one time or another. See THE FEDERALIST, Introduction,supra note 84, at xx-xxi.
However, "the more reliable evidence" indicates that Madison authored the essays in
question." Id. at xxix-xxx. Even assuming, arguendo, that Hamilton's claims of ownership were correct, it is irrelevant for this Note's purpose-to determine the Framers'
intent. Both men played large roles in the birth of the Constitution and both were considered key framers.
129. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 84, at 331 (J. Madison).
130. Id. at 323; see also 1 P. KURLAND & R. LERNER, supra note 83, at 320.
Records of the Federal Convention: "Mr. Dickenson considered the business as so important that no man ought to be silent or reserved. He went into a discourse of some length,
the sum of which was, that the Legislative, Executive, & Judiciary departments ought to
be made as independent as possible. . .

."; Letter

No. 2 from Centinel to the People of

Philadelphia (Oct. 1787) (commenting on the Constitution's executive veto power): "This
mixture of the legislative and executive moreover highly tends to corruption. The chief
improvement in government, in modern times, has been the compleat separation of the
great distinctions of power." Id. at 324. Letter No. 2 from William Penn (Jan. 3, 1788)
(discussing the Constitution's executive veto power):
The first and most natural division of the powers of government are into the
legislature and executive branches. These two should never be suffered to have
the least share of each others jurisdiction, or to intermeddle with it in any
manner. For which ever of the two divides its power with the other, will certainly be subordinate to it, and if they both have a share of each others authority, they will be in fact but one body; their interest as well as their powers will
le the same, and they will combine together against the people.
It is therefore a political error of the greatest magnitude, to allow the executive power a negative, or in fact any kind of control over the proceedings of the
legislature.
Id. at 324-25. The records of the Constitutional Convention chronicle discussions regarding the other branches' abilities to impeach the President:
Mr. King expressed his apprehensions that an extreme caution in favor of liberty might enervate the Government we were forming. He wished the House to
recur to the primitive axiom that the three great departments of
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To dispel concerns that this commingling in the proposed constitution was not a threat to liberty, Madison proceeded to consult the
teachings of Montesquieu, whom Madison considered the "oracle . . . on this subject.'' 113 He noted that Montesquieu considered
the constitution of England the "standard" or "mirrour of political
liberty."1 32 Madison pointed out that within the English constitution
the limited ability to commingle was allowed.133 It was at this point
that Madison penned the phrase in question, separation of powers,
and concluded that some commingling was acceptable and nonthreatening.134 The threat existed when one branch exercised the
Gov[ernments] should be separate [and] independent: that the Executive [and]
Judiciary should be so as well as the Legislative: that the Executive should be
so equally with the Judiciary. Would this be the case if the Executive should be
impeachable? . ..This would be destructive of his independence and of the
principles of the Constitution.
2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 66-67 (1966).
"Hence also sprung that unnecessary and dangerous officer the Vice-President, who for
want of other employment is made president of the Senate, thereby dangerously blending
the executive and legislative powers .

. . ."

Id. at 639 (discussions regarding Vice-Presi-

dent as head of Senate). Eldridge Gerry, remarks to the President of the Senate and
Speaker of the House of Representatives of Massachusetts regarding executive veto
power (Oct. 18, 1787): "My principle objections to the plan, are . ..that the executive
is blended with, and will have an undue influence over, the legislature. . . ." 3 M. FARRAND, supra, at 128; Letter from "[a] citizen of New Haven" appearing in the Connecticut Courant (Jan. 7, 1788): "It is objected that the executive is blended with the legislature, and that these powers ought to be entirely distinct and unconnected .. " 3 M.
JENSEN, THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE UNITED STATES

CONSTITUTION 526 (1976); Letter from "[a]n Officer of the Late Continental Army,"
appearing in the Independent Gazetteer (Nov. 6, 1787):
The objections that have been made to the new Constitution are these:
• . .The LEGISLATIVE and EXECUTIVE powers are not kept separate as
every one of the American constitutions declares they ought to be; but they are
mixed in a manner entirely novel and unknown, even to the constitution of
Great Britain ....
2 M. JENSEN, supra, at 210-11; Letter from "[a] Democratic Federalist," appearing in
the Pennsylvania Herald (October 17, 1787):
At present I shall only observe that it is an established principle in
America . ..that the legislative and executive powers ought to be kept forever separateand distinctfrom each other, and yet in this new Constitution we
find there are TWO EXECUTIVE BRANCHES, each of which has more or
less control over the proceedings of the legislature.This is an innovation of the
most dangerous kind upon every principle of government . ...
Id. at 198; Letter regarding the Constitution from William Shippen, Jr. to Thomas Lee
Shippen, Philadelphia (Nov. 18, 1787): "[T]he legislative and executive power should be
more independent of each other . .

you think
131.
132.
133.
134.

.

.It would then be an excellent Constitution don't

so my son?" Id. at 288.
THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 84, at 324 (J. Madison).
Id. at 325.
Id.
Id. at 325-26.

"whole" power of another. 35 He then asserted that most of the
states had established constitutions which expressly contained vary1 36
ing degrees of commingling.
The key to understanding this essay is that Madison, when writing
the phrase that separation of powers does "not mean that [there]
ought [to be] no partial agency in, or no controul over the [other
branches]," was defending the federal constitution against criticism
that there was too much commingling within the proposed document. There seems to be no other explanation, particularly since the
criticism was directed solely at commingling that ultimately ended
up in the Constitution.137 Therefore, Madison was defending only the
commingling of powers that were within the text of the proposed
constitution. 3 8 From his discussion of state constitutions, 139 where he
135. Id.
136. Id. at 327-31. In rationalizing the commingling in the Federal Constitution,
Madison referred to the constitutions of various states, most of which contained clauses
to the effect that the branches should be kept separate and distinct. He pointed out,
however, that within all of those constitutions limited commingling was allowed. Importantly, the commingling that Madison pointed to, in every case, was expressly provided
for within those states' constitutions. See id.
137. See supra note 130 (executive veto power-U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 2;
impeachability of the executive by other branches-U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6; VicePresident as President of Senate-U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4).

138.

THE FEDERALIST

No. 47, supra note 84, at 331 (J. Madison).

139.
If we look into the constitutions of the several states we find that notwithstanding the emphatical, and in some instances, the unqualified terms in which
this axiom[,] [separation of powers,] has been laid down, there is not a single
instance in which the several departments of power have been kept absolutely
separate and distinct. New Hampshire['s] . . . constitution accordingly mixes
these departments in several respects. [For example, the Senate is a judicial
tribunal for impeachments, the President is the presiding member of the Senate, the President is elected by the Senate, executive officers are chosen by the
Senate, and the judiciary is chosen by the executive].
The constitution of Massachusetts . . . [has a clause declaring that one
branch] shall never exercise [the power of another. This] corresponds precisely
with the doctrine of Montesquieu. . . . [However,] in the very constitution
a partial mixture of powers has been admitted.
The
constitution of
New-York . . . gives . . . to
the
executive . . . controul over the legislative department [and] judiciary[;] the legislature is associated with the executive authority[;] [and] impeachments . . . consist of . . . the legislature and the . . . judiciary ....
The constitution of New-Jersey has blended the different powers of government more than any of the preceding...
According to the constitution[s] of Pennsylvania, .. Delaware, . .. Maryland[,] . . . Virginia[,] . . . North-Carolina, . . . South-Carolina, .... [and]
Georgia, . . . [they all have commingling within them]. ...
.. . In citing these cases, in which legislative, executive and judiciary departments have not been kept totally separate and distinct, I wish not to be
regarded as an advocate for the particular organizations of the several state
governments. . . . What I wish to evince is, that the charge brought against
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pointed to commingling within those documents as a basis for the
existence of commingling in the federal constitution, and to rebut the
criticism that the federal constitution violated the separation of powers doctrine, it seems inconceivable that he was defending anything
other than provisions of our subsequent constitution, such as Article
I, section 3, clause 6 (the Senate's sole power to try all impeachments of executive and judicial officers); 140 Article I, section 7,
clause 2 (the Presidential veto power);' 4 ' Article II, section 2, clause
2 (the Senate's confirmation of executive and judicial officers);"4"
and Article III, section 1 (Congress' power to define the jurisdiction
of the judiciary by virtue of its authority to "ordain and establish . . . inferior Courts"). 43 Madison was stressing that the commingling of powers allowed for within the document was not a threat
to liberty. He was not advocating the commingling of powers4 4 which
were not expressed in the text of the proposed constitution.
Subsequently, Madison, in Federalist number forty-eight," 5 continued his discussion of separation of powers. He reiterated that it
was inconsistent with the separation of powers for one branch to exercise the complete and direct power of another, or for one to have
an overruling influence over the other's administration of its
power. 4 Additionally, one branch should not exercise power "be-

the proposed constitution, of violating a sacred maxim of free government, is
warranted neither by the real meaning annexed to that maxim by its author;

nor by the sense in which it has hitherto been understood in America.
Id. at 327-31 (emphasis added).
140. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 3, cl. 6; see also 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 130, at 6667.
141.

U.S.

CONST.

art. I,

§

7, cl. 2; see also infra note 164; supra note 130; 1 P.

KURLAND & R. LERNER, supra note
3 M. FARRAND, supra note 130, at

83, at 324 (Letters of Centinel and William Penn);
128; 2 M. JENSEN, supra note 130, at 198.

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.
143. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
142.

144.

dissenting)

2; see also infra note 161; supra note 126.

See Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 682-83 (1989) (Scalia, J.,

("the

[F]ramers

themselves

considered

how

much

commingling

was . . . acceptable, and set forth their conclusions in the document").
Much of the controversy over drafting and ratification turned on this question

of meaning [of separation of power]. At issue was not whether the proposed
constitution embodies the separation of powers to some extent (few denied
that), but whether its separation is adequate, whether the purposes for the sake
of which separation of powers is indispensable are indeed well served by the
peculiar manner in which the Constitution effects and compromises that
separation.
1 P. KURLAND & R. LERNER, supra note 83, at 311.
145. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, supra note 84, at 332 (J. Madison).
146. Id.

yond the limits assigned to it."'1 4 7
First, Madison stated that there was an intent, indeed, a practice
at that time, to endorse separation
of powers in its pure, completely
"separate and distinct" form,' 48 and "to mark with precision the
boundaries of these departments in the Constitution.' 4 9 Second,
however, as Madison illustrated earlier, in reality the "pure" concept
of separation of powers was rarely if ever used, evidenced by provisions in nearly all of the states' constitutions allowing some commingling. 15 0 These two facts together indicate that framers of that time
engaged in a practice of marking "with precision" the requisite
amount of constitutional commingling of powers. In other words,
these two facts reinforce the assertion that, whatever commingling
the framers of that time intended, such commingling was within the
document.
To further justify the textual commingling, Madison warned that
"pure" or completely separated branches were not sufficient protection against the "encroaching spirit of power" between the
branches.' 5 ' In particular, the legislative branch was charged with
being a constant usurper of the others' power.' 5 2 The readers were
147. Id.
148. See supra notes 129-44.
This doctrine is not novel in America, it seems on the contrary to be everywhere well understood and admitted beyond controversy; in the bills of rights
or constitutions of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Maryland, Virginia,
North-Carolinaand Georgia, it is expressly declared. That the legislature, executive and judicial departments, shall be forever separate and distinct from
each other.
2 P. KURLAND & R. LERNER, supra note 83, at 324-25 (commentary at that time regarding separation of powers). "At present I shall only observe that it is an established
principle in America, which pervades every one of our state constitutions, that the legislative and executive powers ought to be kept forever separate and distinct from each
other." 2 M. JENSEN, supra note 130, at 198 (commentary at that time regarding separation of powers). "The state constitution of Virginia expressly directs that the legislative,
executive, and judicial departments should be kept separate." Id. at 504 (William FindIcy at Pennsylvania Convention Debates, Dec. 5, 1787).
149. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, supra note 84, at 332-33 (J. Madison); see also Id.
at 327-28 (Massachusetts Constitution--"that the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them: The executive shall never
exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them: The judicial shall never
exercise the legislative or executive powers, or either of them"); Id. at 330 (Maryland
Constitution--"legislative, executive and judicial powers of government, ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other"; Virginia Constitution-"that the Legislative, executive and judiciary departments, shall be separate and distinct; so that neither
exercise the powers properly belonging to the other").
150. See supra note 139.
151. THE FEDERAUiST No. 48, supra note 84, at 333 (J. Madison).
152. Id. at 333-34; see also id. at 333 ("The legislative department is everywhere
extending the sphere of its activity, and drawing all the power into its impetuous vortex."). Madison explained the concern about the legislative branch:
The legislative department derives a superiority in our governments from other
circumstances. Its constitutional powers being at once more extensive and less
susceptible of precise limits, it can with greater facility, mask under compli-
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cautioned to "indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all their precautions" 15 3 against this branch. Madison concluded that controlling the
legislature required more than pure separation of powers-"mere demarkation on parchment of the constitutional limits of the several
departments is not a sufficient guard against those encroachments
which lead to a tyrannical concentration of all powers of the government in the same hands.' 154 In short, something else was necessary
to ensure against tyranny.
55
What was that "something else"? Federalist number fifty-one
asks, and then answers that question: "To what expedient then shall
we finally resort for maintaining in practice the necessary partition
the several departments, as laid down in the
of power among
56
constitution?'
Madison answered that the expedients that would finally control
the branches were the "interior" safeguards "laid down in the constitution."'' 57 He reiterated that the "external provisions" of pure separation of powers safeguards were inadequate, 5 5 and therefore
"[s]ome deviations," or "internal" commingling, must be allowed. 159
cated and indirect measures, the encroachments which it makes on the co-ordinate departments. It is not unfrequently a question of real-nicety in legislative
bodies, whether the operations of a particular measure, will, or will not extend
beyond the legislative sphere. On the other side, the executive power being restrained within a narrower compass, and being more simple in its nature; and
the judiciary being described by land marks, still less uncertain, projects of
usurpation by either of these departments, would immediately betray and defeat themselves. Nor is this all: As the legislative department alone has access
to the pockets of the people, and has in some Constitutions full discretion, and
in all, a prevailing influence over the pecuniary rewards of those who fill the
other departments, a dependence is thus created in the latter, which gives still
greater facility to encroachments of the former.
Id. at 334; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 71, supra note 84, at 481, 483 (A. Hamilton)
(arguing that "[t]he tendency of the legislative authority to absorb every other, has been
fully displayed and illustrated").
153. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, supra note 84, at 334 (J. Madison).
154. Id. at 338.
155. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 84, at 347 (J. Madison).
156. Id. (emphasis added).
157. Id. The plain language, "as laid down in the constitution," further validates
the proposition that the commingling or "partial agency in" which Madison spoke of was
within the Constitution.
158. Id.
159. Id.; see United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1211 n.12 (3rd Cir. 1978)
(Garth, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("The design of checks and balances
fundamental to our tripartite structure of government is predicated upon, and in a sense
is the converse of, the separation of powers."), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979); United
States v. Brainer, 515 F. Supp. 627 (D. Md. 1981) ("The separation of powers within
the government was never intended, nor has it proven to be, complete. A system of
checks and balances was included in the scheme to prevent one branch from

These deviations were to act as a series of internal checks and balances and were intended as a "means of keeping each [of the
branches] in their proper places."' 60 Madison pointed to several examples of power commingling that would check and balance the
branches-the appointment and confirmation of judges by the executive and the legislative branches, 16 the judiciary's life tenure,1 6 2 a
bicameral legislature,163 the executive veto power, 64 and the division
of power between the federal and state governments. 65 Every
"deviation" that Madison cited was found in our subsequent Constitution.' 66 Madison endorsed no commingling that cannot now be
found within the text. It is abundantly clear that the only commingling endorsed by Madison and his contemporaries, and later ratified
by the states, was that exclusively within the document. Indeed,
many other forms of commingling were proposed and considered, but
were ultimately rejected at the Convention. 6 7 These rejected propospredominating.").
160. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 84, at 348 (J.Madison); "[T]he great
security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department
consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional
means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others .... Ambition must
be made to counteract ambition." Id.; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,122 (1975);
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 469-70 (1972) (Rehnquist, J.,dissenting); Moore v.
United States House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985); United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1211 (3rd Cir.
1978) (Garth, J.,concurring in part, dissenting in part), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913
(1979); National Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587, 612 (D.C. Cir.
1974); United States v. Brainer, 515 F. Supp. 627 (D. Md. 1981); Staebler v. Carter,
464 F. Supp. 585, 598 (D.D.C. 1979); United States v. Howard, 440 F. Supp. 1106,
1109-10 (D. Md. 1977), affid, 590 F.2d 564 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976

(1979).

161. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 84, at 348 (J.Madison); U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 2, cl.2.
162. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 84, at 348 (J.Madison); U.S. CONST.

art. III, § 1.

163. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 84, at 350 (J.Madison); U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 1.
164. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 84, at 351 (J. Madison); U.S, CONST.
art. I, § 7, cl.2.
165. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 84, at 351 (J.Madison); U.S. CONST.
art. IV. Shortly after ratification of the Constitution, this area was clarified somewhat by
the tenth amendment: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States, respectively, or to the
people." U.S. CONST. amend X; see, I. SLOAN, DESK-ToP GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION
26-27 (1987) (Sept. 25, 1789-Senate approves Bill of Rights; Dec. 15, 1791-Bill of
Rights becomes part of Constitution).
166. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 84, at 347-53 (J.
Madison).
167. See, e.g., 1 M. JENSEN, supra note 130, at 237-38; id. at 244 (judges to serve
with President on Council of Revision to veto laws of Congress); id. at 237, 244, 247
(judges to be appointed by Congress); id. at 244-45, 247, 249-50, 252, 254-55, 259, 26768, 280-81 (jurisdiction in cases involving impeachment of national officers); id. at 249,
259, 265-66, 277-78 (judges to be appointed by Senate); id. at 265-66, 277-78 (upon
request of state, Senate to establish court to settle disputes among states over lands
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als, in today's terms, are the functional equivalent of the nontextual,
extra-constitutional commingling validated in Morrison and Mistretta. In light of these circumstances, hypothesizing that the Fram-

ers endorsed extra-constitutional commingling seems illogical.
Madison makes two final observations about the proposed federal

system of government: (1) power usurpations are guarded against by
branches of government that are relatively separate and distinct,"6"
and (2) such separateness will help to ensure that the minority is not
oppressed by the majority. 1 9 By having such a decentralized form of
federal governmental power, "the rights of individuals or of the minority will be in little danger."'' 0 The proposed federal government
was thought to enhance the security of rights because it brought together a multiplicity
of interests which safeguard against an oppres171
sive majority.
Federalist number fifty-one makes the connection between the importance of keeping the powers as separate as possible, except for

those within the Constitution which are needed to check and balance, and the resultant infringement upon individual rights for fail-

ure to do so. Therefore, it is extremely important to be cautious
whenever analyzing separation of powers questions because ulti-

mately the breakdown of separation of powers
leads to the contrac2
tion or elimination of individual rights. 1
Federalist numbers forty-nine17 3 and fifty 7 4 deal with the subject
of constitutional amendment. The essays express Madison's disapproval of a proposed method of amending the Constitution. The writings convey that (1) to change the Constitution it must be

amended,' 7 ' and (2) the legislature, once again, should be feared.

granted by different states); id. at 254 (Executive to appoint heads of executive departments); id. at 236, 244, 246, 249, 257 (legislative power to veto state laws); id. at 23738, 244, 246, 249, 252, 258, 266, 269, 278, 284 (legislature to elect President); id. at
244, 247 (legislature to appoint judges); id. at 246-47 (legislature to be last resort on
appeals in state versus state disputes); id. at 247 (legislature to create executive departments); id. at 252 (legislature to remove President); id. at 264, 275, 285, 289 (legislature
to appoint Treasurer).
168. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 84, at 351 (J. Madison).
169. Id. at 351-53.
170. Id. at 351.
171. Id. at 351-53.
172. "In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite
and oppress the weaker, anarchy may truly be said to reign, as in a state of nature where
the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger ....

" Id. at

352,
173.
174.
175.

THE FEDERALIST No. 49, supra note 84, at 338 (J. Madison).
THE FEDERALIST No. 50, supra note 84, at 343 (J. Madison).
Indeed, a plan to amend the Constitution was incorporated into the document.

The legislature "possesses so many of the means of operating on the
motives of the other department. 176
These essays demonstrate that amending the Constitution was the
only method the Framers endorsed to change the instrument. Consistent with this proposition is the fact that, a short time after ratification of the Constitution, the Bill of Rights was added. 177 Because the
only commingling of powers endorsed by the Constitution was in the
document, numbers forty-nine and fifty suggest
that extra-constitu18
tional commingling requires an amendment.
Consolidating the principles synthesized from the essays in The
Federalist, the following conclusions may be reached: because
"pure" separations of powers are an insufficient safeguard against
power consolidation,'1 9 and nontextual commingling was not endorsed by the Framers, 180 all nontextual commingling is invalid if it
is an exercise by the branch of power beyond the limits assigned to
it.'"' Furthermore, if extra-constitutional commingling is desired, it
must be accomplished by means of amendment. 82 Also, because the
legislative branch is the strongest branch and the one most likely to
usurp power, 18 3 any shifting or commingling of power by this branch
should be carefully scrutinized.
Functionalists might argue that, although it is reasonable to disallow commingling when Congress takes power away from one branch
and gives it to itself, there is no harm where (as in Mistretta) Congress is giving its own power away or, where (as in Morrison) it is
reassigning powers between the judicial and the executive branches
(assuming the branches, after the shifting, retain the same aggregate
amount of power). Superficially, this sounds like a valid argument.
However, upon further analysis, there are strong reasons to disallow
commingling even when Congress is giving its power away or shifting power between the other branches.
First, and foremost, the Framers' intent indicates that the ConstiSee U.S. CONST. art V.
176. THE FEDERALIST No. 49, supra note 84, at 339 (J. Madison).
177. See I. SLOAN, supra note 165, at 26-27.
178. "Madison . . . believed that the Constitution . . .could only be changed
through amendment or a clear, continued, and equivalent expression of the national
will." Ong, supra note 115, at 18. Indeed, if proximity of these essays in The Federalist
to one another (essays forty-seven to fifty-one), as well as dates of authorship (all five
essays are dated within eight days of one another, Feb. 1-8, 1788), and the continuity of
the targeted readership (all essays written to The People of New York) are any indicator, it seems very plausible that Madison was giving those opposed to the commingling of
powers in the Constitution the avenue for change.
179. See supra notes 151-65 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 129-44 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 173-78 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
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tution is the definitive answer to what power shifting is acceptable. 84
As Federalist number forty-seven explained, and numbers forty-eight
and fifty-one supported, acceptable shifting of power was in the text
of the document, and any other shifting was void unless it was a
power expressly assigned to it by the Constitution.'8 5
Second, Congress is the most powerful of the three branches. 186
Congress can give its power away, yet continue to predominate. 8 In
addition, Congress has "a prevailing influence over the pecuniary re""I
wards of those who fill the other departments ....
The shift of power to the other branches could be used as an inducement to obtain the endorsement or the silence of the executive
or of the judiciary, so that Congress might accomplish unconstitutional ends. Because members of Congress would "be able to plead
their cause most successfully with the people,"' 89 its conduct would
likely remain unimpeded by either the electorate or the other
branches. If Congress were given this bargaining or leveraging tool,
coupled with the power of the purse strings, it would be able to manipulate the other two branches for its own "aggrandizement." 190
Mistretta exemplifies this notion. Congress gave the executive
branch the power to appoint and the judicial branch the power to
promulgate laws, and thus allowed itself to avoid potential political
accountability for any laws regarding sentencing. Neither branch
complained that the commingling was unconstitutional. The end result was that Congress created a "junior varsity Congress,"'' within
the judiciary with the power to promulgate guidelines with the binding effect of law-an unconstitutional expansion of its power to
legislate. 92
184. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 682 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); supra notes 129-72 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 129-72 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 152.

187.
188.
189.
190.

See supra note 86.
See supra note 152.
THE FEDERALIST No. 49, supra note 84, at 342 (J. Madison).
"The tendency of the legislative authority to absorb every other, has been

fully displayed and illustrated ....

"

THE FEDERALIST No. 71, supra note 84, at 483

(A. Hamilton).
191. Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 683 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
192. Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958). "[T]he proper apportionment[s] of punishment . . . are peculiarly questions of legislative policy." Id.; see also
Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele, 857 F.2d 1245, 1254 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Reason and authority point squarely to the conclusion that the Commission is assigned the function of
promulgating substantive rules and policies governing primary conduct and having the
force and effect of law, tasks that only the legislative or executive branches, not the
judicial branch, may constitutionally perform.") (emphasis added).

Similarly, this tool, when used to shift power to the executive and
judicial branches, could be used as a reward or as punishment to
induce capitulation to congressional will. 193 Congress, when it wished
to accomplish a constitutionally impermissible goal, could placate
the complaining branch by granting it some new power. 94 Also,
Congress, under a functionalism model, would be able to punish a
branch that did not go along with its wishes by taking power away
from the branch and giving it to another.191
B. Incorrect Factors Are Used in FunctionalAnalysis
In Mistretta, the Court incorrectly assumed that extra-constitutional commingling of powers was permissible. Therefore, the entire
focus of the analysis was distorted. Rather than focusing on what the
Framers intended as strong authority for its decision, the Court used
the Framers' intent expressed in the Constitution merely as a starting point for its analysis. As pointed out by Justice Scalia in dissent,
the Court
treat[s] the Constitution as though it were no more than a generalized pre-

scription that the functions of the Branches should not be commingled too
much-how much is to be determined, case-by-case, by this Court. The
Constitution is not that .... [T]he framers themselves considered how
much commingling was[] . . .acceptable, and set forth their conclusions in

the document.19 8

The Court's inquiry starts with the premise that powers may be
commingled if the shifting is not "more appropriately performed by
the other Branches. 1 1 97 This premise is equivalent to the inquiry
whether the exercise of power is "incongruent" to the branch exer193. E.g., Morrison v. Olsen, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988). Pursuant to the Ethics in
Government Act of 1978, the legislature gave the judiciary power to appoint, terminate,
and define the jurisdiction of an independent counsel. The independent counsel had investigatory and prosecutorial power, and was required to report to Congress. In effect, the
independent counsel, endowed with executive powers, was beholden to both the judiciary
and Congress.
Unsurprisingly, the judiciary validated the Act. The Supreme Court's decision allowed
the taking of power from the executive branch and shifting power to the judiciary and
legislature. One might speculate that the motive behind the Act was to retaliate for recent conflicts between the executive branch and Congress during the Nixon era. As a
result of Nixon's clashes with congressional will, the legislature decided to take power
away from the executive and give it mainly to the judiciary, reserving some of the power
to itself. The judiciary accepted the power, and subsequently validated its (and Congress') own aggrandizement.
194. See id. (Congress grants judiciary power to appoint, terminate, and determine
jurisdiction of independent counsel endowed with Executive's prosecutorial and investigatory powers).
195. Id. (Congress takes power to appoint, terminate (except for "cause") and
generally control independent counsel exercising executive power from the President).
196. Mistretta v. United States, 109 S.Ct. 647, 682 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
197. See id. at 661.
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cising it, as expressed in Morrison.198
Another factor considered in Mistretta is whether the exercise of

power "undermines the integrity of the Judiciary."

99

This factor is

the same as Morrison's inquiry of whether the exercise of the power

impedes a branch in the discharge of its Constitutional duties. °0
The Court in Mistretta also uses an administrative convenience 20"
factor in resolving the issues. For example, the Court characterizes
the Commission's job as "the sort of intricate, labor-intensive task
for which delegation . . . is especially appropriate. ' 20 2 "Practical
consequences" dictated that it was best to have the judicial branch
formulate the guidelines because "of the judiciary's special knowl-

edge and expertise," and because the work involved "do[ing] what
[judges] have done for generations.

20 3

The use of "incongruity," "impeding," and "administrative convenience" to determine whether a commingling violates the separation
of powers doctrine is erroneous 20 4 because none follow a fundamental
interpret
rule of constitutional construction;20 5 they do not properly
208
the Framers' intent as evidenced in The Federalist.
The inquiry into whether the power exercised is incongruent with

that branch ignores the Framers' intent as illustrated in The Feder198. Morrison v. Olsen, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2611 (1988).
199. Mistretta, 109 S.Ct. at 661.
200. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2619.
201. Carter, supra note 105, at 13. According to Professor Carter:
Justice Harry Blackmun's majority opinion quite cleverly asserted that the legislation simply "consolidates" in the Sentencing Commission "the power that
had been exercised by the sentencing judge and the Parole Commission to decide what punishment an offender should suffer." This is a bit like saying that
the Constitution simply consolidates in the federal government the power that
had been exercised by the several states. Both statements make radical restructuring of the allocation of authority by treating them as mere administrative
conveniences.
Id.
202. Mistretta, 109 S.Ct. at 658.
203. See id.at 667.
204. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (no inquiry regarding impeding or incongruence of power shifting); I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (no
inquiry regarding impeding or incongruence of power shifting); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 (1976) (no inquiry regarding impeding or incongruence of power shifting);
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (no inquiry regarding
impeding or incongruence of power shifting); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346
(1911) (no inquiry regarding impeding or incongruence of power shifting); Hayburn's
Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792) (no inquiry regarding impeding or incongruence of
power shifting). For the error in using administrative convenience as a factor, see infra
notes 221-27 and accompanying text.
205. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.

alist. This inquiry does not concern itself with whether the power
being exercised is "the whole power of another branch, ' 20 7 whether
the branch exercised the complete power more properly belonging to
another branch, 0 8 whether it possesses an overruling influence over
the other branches in the exercise of their respective powers,2 °0 or
whether the power exceeds the power given to the branch by the
Constitution. 210 The inquiry ignores that the Framers specified
in the
21
Constitution what amount of commingling was acceptable. '
Although the incongruity inquiry in Mistretta considers whether
the judiciary is exercising the power more properly belonging to another branch, this factor is apparently dismissed with little or no
treatment by the Court. The Court heeded the warning and inquired
into whether the power exercised more properly belonged to another
branch. It conceded that the Commission was involved in substantive
rulemaking that allowed the judiciary to "exercise a greater degree
of politicaljudgment than has been exercised in the past by any one
entity within the Judicial Branch. ' 21 2 However, because the work of
the Commission was related to judicial duties and because the Commission was independent from the judicial branch, the exercise of
power was deemed constitutional.21 3 In effect, the Court decided that
the exercise of the power by the judiciary was not unconstitutional
even though it was political and indeed substantive rulemaking--clearly legislative domain. The Court acknowledged Madison's
207. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
209. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
211. Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 682 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting),
("[T]he framers themselves considered how much commingling was, in the generality of
things, acceptable, and set forth their conclusions in the document."). Id. Justice Blackmun's summary quote of Madison's writings are uninformed and simply distort the
meaning of Madison's words in order to justify a result. See Wilson, supra note 83.
Professor Wilson observes that, generally, "the Court has not made a real effort to understand The Federalist." Id. at 67. The Court "has not taken advantage of the abundant research and theories of scholars" on this subject. Id. at 125. "A legal realist . . . may conclude that . . . the Court . . . decide[s] cases by relying primarily on
their own values." Id.
212. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 666-67 (emphasis added).
213. See id. at 666-67; but cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 589 (1952) ("The founders of this Nation entrusted the law making power to the
Congress alone in both good times and bad."). Justice Scalia pointed out the inconsistency in the Court's opinion, with respect to their holding that the Commission was
within the judicial branch yet was independent:
Separation of powers problems are dismissed, however, on the ground that
"[the Commission's] powers are not united with the powers of the []udiciary
in a way that has meaning for separation of powers analysis," since the Commission "is not a court, does not exercise judicial power, and is not controlled
by or accountable to members of the [j]udicial [b]ranch . . . ." In light of the
latter concession, I am at a loss to understand why the Commission is "within
the ij]udicial branch" in any sense that has relevance to today's discussion.
Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 680-81 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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admonition that combining legislative and judicial powers would result in "arbitrary controul" over life and liberty,214 yet it apparently
dismissed the warning as unimportant. This demonstrates a disregard for a portion of the Framers' intent and a basic concept of our
government-that the judiciary should not get involved in the political arena.215 Therefore, reliance on an incongruity factor, as it is
interpreted by the Court in Mistretta, circumvents the separation of
powers doctrine.
The Court next inquired into whether the power exercised by the
Commission impeded the judiciary's integrity or its ability to remain
impartial. 1 6 This factor, like the incongruity factor above, disregards the Framers' intent on the separation of powers doctrine.
2 17
There is no inquiry into the three factors set out by the Framers.
There is no acknowledgement that the Constitution is the definitive
answer on acceptable comminglings of power. The only inquiry is
whether the exercise will impede or undermine the judiciary in its
constitutional functions. As noted above, the Court conceded that
the power exercised by the Commission was political. However, the
power did not impede or
Court felt that this newly acquired political
218
judiciary.
the
of
integrity
the
undermine
Although the judiciary is the weakest of the three branches, it remains weak only as long as it "remains truly distinct from both the
legislative and executive [powers]." 2' "'[T]here is no liberty, if the
power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive
powers.' -122o Once again, the Court's analysis directly contradicts
the Framers' separation of powers doctrine.
The use of an administrative convenience factor also runs contrary
to the Framers' intent on separation of powers. Instead of consulting
the Constitution, case law, or the Framers, the Court merely concludes that the delegation of power was acceptable because the Commission was better suited to perform that work.221
214. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 666.
215. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
216. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 671. The Court uses the term, "undermines the judiciary's integrity." Essentially this inquiry is the same as "impedes," in that the Court
asks whether the power shifting thwarts or frustrates the judiciary's integrity or impartiality. See supra notes 199-200.
217. See supra notes 207-09 and accompanying text.
218. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 672.
219. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 84, at 523 (A. Hamilton).
220. Id.
221. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 658, 667; see supra notes 46, 63-64 and accompanying text.

Notwithstanding that this is an unprecedented basis for allowing a
shifting of power, the Court forgets that an administrative convenience rationale has repeatedly failed in the past when used to re-

solve other pressing constitutional issues.2 22 It is particularly inappli-

cable to separation of powers issues. "[I]t is crystal clear from the
records of the Convention, contemporaneous writings and debates,
that the Framers ranked other values higher than efficiency.

' 22 3

The

choices the Framers made in the Constitutional Convention about
the separation of powers
impose burdens on governmental processes that often seem clumsy, inefficient, even unworkable, but those hard choices were consciously made by
men who had lived under a form of government that permitted arbitrary
governmental acts to go unchecked. There is no support in the Constitution
or decisions of this Court for the proposition that the cumbersomeness and
delays often encountered in complying with explicit constitutional standards
may be avoided. . . With all the obvious flaws of delay, untidiness, and
potential for abuse, we have not yet found a better way to preserve freedom
than by making the exercise of 22power
subject to carefully crafted restraints
4
spelled out in the Constitution.

Our governmental structure of checks and balances was intended to
"[slow] the operation of government.

'225

"In sum, the Framers chose

our structure of government, for all its inefficiencies,
the better to
22 6
secure liberty and to guard against tyranny.

The use of the above factors is very troublesome. They ignore the
Framers' intent 22 7 and seriously imperil the concept of separation of
powers. 228 If functionalism, as used in Mistretta, has not delivered a

death blow to the doctrine of separation of powers, it has at least,
put separation of powers "on the ropes. 229
222. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690-91 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). Although these
cases dealt with equal protection claims, they should be equally applicable here. The
reason is that separation of powers is the vehicle that ensures individual rights such as
equal protection. If administrative convenience does not apply in the context of equal
protection, surely it should not apply to the cornerstone that protects and allows such
rights to exist.
223. I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958-59 (1983).
224. Id. at 959. Indeed, if the framers intended to facilitate governance, one would
think that they would have created an "uni-parte" form of government where one centralized branch would make all decisions. This would have been much more convenient
from an administrative perspective. But, instead they purposefully chose a system that
eschewed administrative convenience in favor of one that protected the masses from easy
overreaching by the government.
225. Beckett, Separationof Powers and Federalism: Their Impact on Individual
Liberty and the Functioning of Our Government, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 635, 640

(1988).
226.

575, 585
227.
228.
229.

Burns & Markman, Understanding Separation of Powers, 7 PAcE L. REV.

(1987).
See, Carter, supra note 105, at 13.
Id.
Id.
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C. Contraction of Individual Rights and the Destruction of
Separation of Powers
As noted before, the concentration of power in the same hands is
the very definition of tyranny.23 0 There can be no liberty where the
legislative and executive powers are combined. 3 1 Similarly, there is
no liberty where the judicial power is not separated from the other
two branches. 23 2 The separation of powers doctrine is the essential
precaution in favor of liberty. 2 3 Separation of powers ensures that
individual rights and the rights of minorities are protected against
the oppression of the majority.3 4
It is hard to believe, in this day and age, that a Supreme Court
decision on separation of powers is a threat to individual rights and
freedoms. Nevertheless, it is, and for several reasons. Separation of
powers provides the governmental structure that prevents tyranny, or
dictatorships. The lack of tyranny allows for the development and
embellishment of individual rights.23 5 Separation of powers "is not

deeply ingrained in the American constitutional ethos. 23 6 The average citizen, and even lawyers,237 do not recognize the vital link between separation of powers and liberty. 38 This ignorance, or apathy,
gives Congress the ability to enact legislation that ultimately aggran-

dizes its power.2 39 The average American takes personal liberties for
granted, and actions by Congress seem unimportant or inconsequential. However, "[t]hat's the problem with tyranny: It creeps. '"240 It is
interesting to note that the only federal appeals court opinion to
overturn the Act was written by a person that experienced tyr230. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 84, at 324 (J. Madison).
231. Id. at 325.
232. Id.; see supra note 220 and accompanying text.
233. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 84, at 323 (J. Madison).
234. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 84, at 351-53 (J. Madison).
235. For example, consider the United States world standing as a leader in democracy and individual rights.
236. Carter, suprb note 105, at 25.
237. Id.
238. "After all, when most Americans think about their constitutional rights at all,
they tend to think in terms of what they are free to do without government interference.
The idea of a constitutional right to a particular government structure is not deeply ingrained in the American constitutional ethos." Id.
239. E.g., Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989); Morrison v. Olsen,
108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988). Congress, under the decisions in these two cases, seems to have
virtually unlimited power to create independent agencies. "I foresee all manner of 'expert' bodies, insulated from the political process, to which Congress will delegate various
portions of its lawmaking responsibility." Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 680 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
240. Carter, supra note 105, at 25.

anny.2 41 This is at least some indication that persons who have experienced a deprivation of liberty are more sensitive and attuned to
Those who have
the seriousness of separation of powers issues. 242hohv
known nothing but liberty are wise to take heed.
V.

FORMALISM Is THE BETTER APPROACH

Undoubtedly, determining the Framers' intent is very elusive.24 3
However, the Framers themselves commanded courts to discern the
Constitution's meaning by focusing on what they intended to
mean. 24 4 This Note concludes that formalism as opposed to functionalism, better reflects this intent. 246 Although formalism may not mirror the Framers' intent with absolute exactitude, it comes much
closer than functionalism.
The Framers considered the separation of powers indispensable in
ensuring liberty. 246 Formalism better ensures separation of powers by
not considering misguided factors (such as incongruity, impeding,
and administrative convenience) that effectively ignore the doctrine
as the Framers intended. Instead, the inquiry is whether the exer241. Judge Alex Kozinski authored the opinion in the case of Gubiensio-Ortiz v.
Kanahele, 857 F.2d 1245 (9th Cir. 1988). Judge Kozinski immigrated to the United
States at age 12 from Communist Romania in Eastern Europe. MacLean, Boyish U.S.
Judge Vigorously Fights Excesses of Power, L.A. Times, Feb. 19, 1989, pt. 1, at 3, col.
5.
"I remember from my childhood seeing people locked up in their pajamas in
the middle of the night by police," he said. . . . "My father and I had a signal. I was very small, and he said, 'If you ever start talking, and I give you the
signal, you must stop.' He couldn't afford to let a small child say stupid things
in public . . . things critical of the government," Kozinski recalled. "I feel
probably more suspicious of governmental power than most people ... "
Id. at 42, Col. 1.
242. Judge Kozinski's Romania has recently overthrown its Communist dictatorship in favor of a democracy. It is in the process of drafting a new constitution. Judge
Kozinski's views were requested in establishing the new Constitution. See Wiehl, Constitution, Anyone? A New Cottage Industry, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1990, § B, at 6, col. 3.
The first draft of the new Romanian constitution, reportedly is based on the separation of
powers between the executive, legislative and judicial branches. See Mackenzie, Draft
Romanian Constitution Emphasizes Human Rights, REUTERS (Jan. 10, 1990). Other
eastern block countries, such as Hungary, who have overthrown their Communist governments and are in the processing of instituting a new form of government, are "particularly interested in the separation of powers." Wiehl, supra, at 6, col. 3.
243. See Brest, supra note 83, at 218-23.
244. See Ong, supra note 115, at 18.
245. See supra notes 196-229 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 83-96, 120 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 196-229 and accompanying text. Any argument that the factors of functionalism merely refine the need for separation of powers is erroneous. This
argument is the equivalent of saying that Framers' intent is nondeterminative. Additionally, it ignores the text of the Constitution. It totally ignores the fact that the Framers
determined and expressed within the Constitution what form separation of powers would
take. In place of a doctrine that has been little changed for over 200 years (until recently), and which has resulted in a nation generally considered a bastion of liberty, is
substituted a doctrine that will change or "refine" our governmental structure, "[from
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cising branch is the same as the power being exercised. 248 This rule
is much less lenient in allowing commingling of power.2 4 9 To say it

another way, the inquiry stops if the power exercised is not being
exercised by the proper branch.25 0 The restrictiveness of the rule co-

incides with the fact that the Framers outlined the only permissible

situations where powers could be commingled.25 ' If the power exer-

cised is not consonant with the exercising branch, or is not excepted
by the allowances within the Constitution, there should be no inquiry
time to time], . . .so long as, in the changing view of the Supreme Court, . . . 'too
much commingling' does not occur." Mistretta v. United States, 109 S.Ct. 647, 683
(1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
In other words, the responsibility for deciding the structure of our government is
shifted from the Founding Fathers to a group nine men and women, and their value
judgments. Stare decisis and history are abandoned in favor of allowing the unprecedented "refining" of our government structure by a politically unaccountable group. This
would allow unbridled freedom for the Supreme Court to legislate their own views without the restraints of history, precedent and political accountability to guide and control
them. Such a doctrine consolidates the power to legislate and adjudicate within one
branch, and thus, "'the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary
countrol.'" Mistretta, 109 S.Ct. at 666 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note
84, at 326 (J. Madison) (quoting Montesquieu)).
Formalism requires "[a]dherence to the text and original understanding
[which] . ..constrains the discretion of decisionmakers and assure[s] that the Constitution will be interpreted consistently over time." Brest, supra note 83, at 204. Surely,
one would prefer a model that ensures a stable government structure that has proven its
worth as a protector of liberty, as opposed to a structure that changes upon the whims of
an unaccountable, uncontrollable decisionmaker.
248. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
[T]he key to separation of powers disputes lies in determining whether the
challenged action should be characterized as lawmaking, in which case the
power is to remain in the province of the legislature; as enforcing the law, in
which case it is to remain the prerogative of the executive branch; as to interpreting the law, in which case it falls within the domain of the judiciary.
Krent, supra note 97, at 1254; see also Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 589 (1952) ("The Founders of this
Nation entrusted the lawmaking power to the Congress alone in both good and bad
times."); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
249. If such a rule were employed in Mistretta (judiciary admittedly exercising
substantial rulemaking power of legislature) the power shifting would certainly have
been invalidated. E.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube, 343 U.S. at 589 ("The Founders of
this Nation entrusted the lawmaking power to the Congress alone in both good and bad
times."). Morrison (judiciary exercising control over counsel with executive powers), too
would be invalidated. E.g., Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 734 ("The Constitution does not permit[] . ..intrusion" by other branches into the executive's responsibility for "execution" of the laws).
250. E.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube, 343 U.S. at 589; Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 72627, 734.
251. See supra notes 129-44 and accompanying text. In light of the historical evidence showing the rejection of numerous proposals for commingling at the Constitutional
Convention, to think that the Framers considered ad hoc, extra-constitutional commingling as appropriate, is gravely mistaken. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.

into the validity of the commingling ends-the commingling is impermissible. 252 Once it is determined that the commingling is void,
and therefore unconstitutional, there is no need to consider whether
the commingling is incongruent, whether it impedes, or whether it is
convenient. Formalism does not consider the 3former, and therefore,
is more consistent with the Framers' intent.1

The Framers were very uneasy about tyranny. This explains why

they formed a government of "distinct and separate departments," 2 "

and wove the concept of separation of powers into the Constitution. 255 The net result of formalism is that, compared to functionalism, it keeps the branches separated in a manner more closely akin
to the way it was when the Founding Fathers framed the Constitution.256 Therefore,
it better maintains "this well-worn but durable
'257
doctrine.
One may think that Morrison's commingling of power was not a
bad idea in light of past executive abuses such as Watergate and the
Reagan administration's "sleaze factor." Additionally, commingling
power so that uniformity in sentencing can be achieved does not
seem likely to lead to tyranny. The problem with these examples is
that they do not appear to attack individual rights and democratic
freedom. Indeed, a cursory look indicates that Morrison and Mistretta may actually enhance individual rights. For example, Morrison improves the chances of discovering and eliminating unconstitutional executive activities that could possibly implicate individual
rights; Mistretta better ensures that convicted individuals will not be
252. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 727.
253. Formalism does not create new comminglings of power that are not endorsed
within the Constitution, as does functionalism. Therefore, the doctrine is preserved in a
manner more akin to the way the Framers instituted it. Functionalism, on the other
hand, in many cases would validate a commingling that does not make it past the threshold inquiry of formalism. E.g., Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989); Morrison v. Olsen, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988); see also supra note 249 and accompanying text.
254. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 84, at 351 (J. Madison); see also Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 57 (1982) ("[T]he Framers
provided that the Federal Government would consist of three distinct branches .... ").
255. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124 (1976).
Of the doctrine of the separation of powers, so familiar to readers of Supreme
Court opinions, the Constitution says not a word ....

Yet the framework of

government outlined in the Constitution of 1787 presupposes the separation of
powers [and] gives expression to it ....

The Constitution, far from being a

dubious exemplar of the separation of powers, became a classic instance of the
doctrine it never mentions.
1 P. KURLAND & R. LERNER, supra note 83, at 311.
256. Professor Carter made the following observations about differences between
the analysis used in formalism versus that used by functionalism: "The painstaking assessment of the original understanding that had . . . dominated separation of powers
jurisprudence [until Morrison] was conspicuous by its absence ....
[T]he Court [in
Mistretta and Morrison] deemed it unnecessary to consider the views of the founders on
separation of powers." Carter, supra note 105, at 13.
257. Id.

Mistretta v. United States
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deprived of their liberty longer than other, similarly situated persons.
Superficially, these cases appear to advance desirable objectives.
However, "'[t]he hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power, even to accomplish desirable objectives, must be resisted.' "258
To be sure, where this line of cases interpreting separation of powers will lead is uncertain. But it is clear the Court, with the advent of
Morrison and Mistretta, which basically discard Framers' intent and
its inherent restraint on decisionmaking, 250 is giving itself much
more leeway to determine the architecture of our system of government. Unfortunately, this newly found discretion appears to be nothing more than capitulation to "the congressional judgment on what
was needed to facilitate independence. . . . [C]ongressional judgment on wise policy . . . [is] what matter[s] most."260 Congress,
with its sleight-of-hand legislation in Mistretta, gives the appearance
that "[n]othing has changed" with respect to separation of powers. 26 1 This is reason for concern, as the legislature has begun to do
just what Madison warned us it would do-usurp power, and thus
pave its way toward power consolidation, "the very definition of
tyranny. 2 6 The Supreme Court is steering away from the meaning of the separation of powers doctrine as it has been traditionally known - indeed, away from a meaning that has resulted in the world's longest
surviving written constitution-into uncharted waters of future uncertainty. The "essential precaution in favor of liberty," as formalism has known it, appears to be headed for extinction. 63
VI.

CONCLUSION

Mistretta v. United States stands as dangerous precedent in future
separation of powers cases. This Note concludes that the analysis
endorsed in Mistretta is flawed in that it fails to accurately discern
258. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727 (1986) (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 951 (1983)).
259. See supra note 247 and accompanying text. Formalism requires "[a]dherence
to the textual and original understanding [which] . . . constrains the discretion of decisionmakers and assure[s] the Constitution will be interpreted consistently over time."
Brest, supra note 83, at 204.
260. Carter, supra note 105, at 13.
261. Id.
262. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 84, at 324 (J. Madison).
263. Justice Scalia, the lone dissenter, was the only Justice whose analysis was
harmonious with formalism. The landslide majority (8-1) embracing functionalism seems
certain to extinguish formalism as a mode of analysis for the foreseeable future.

the Framers' intent, and therefore inaccurately reflects the Constitution. Admittedly, it is very difficult to determine with preciseness
what the Framers intended or what the Constitution means in many
instances-separation of powers included. However, ample evidence
supports the position of formalism. 2 4 Notwithstanding this evidence,
there is an underlying theme to this Note: The fundamental reason
the Framers included separation of powers within the Constitution
was to ensure liberty and individual rights, and to thwart the legislature's unquenchable thirst for power. Thus, when considering separation of powers issues, if after consulting original intent, the answer is
unclear, the interpreter should err in favor of the outcome which
promotes liberty and individual rights, that is, on the side of rebuffing congressional will. This guarantees that the basic intent of the
Framers will prevail in a situation which is otherwise uncertain-a
desirable result in such circumstances. 6 5
Formalism, as compared to functionalism, assures that courts construing the separation of powers doctrine will reach a result more
harmonious with what the Framers intended. Such decisions will ensure that liberty flourishes and that Congress' will remains controlled. Thus, what the Framers intended through the Constitution is
accomplished, while preserving a structure that has guaranteed and
nourished liberty for over 200 years.
ARTHUR C. LEAHY

264. See supra notes 129-95 and accompanying text.
265. This assumes, again, that Framers' intent is important in interpreting the
Constitution. See supra note 83.

